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We analyze a dynamic microstructure model in which a dealer market (DM) and a crossing
network (CN) interact for three informational settings. A key result is that coexistence of
trading systems generates systematic patterns in order ￿ ow, which depend on the degree
of transparency. Further, we study overall welfare, measured by the gains from trade of
all agents, and compare it to the maximum overall welfare. The discrepancy between both
measures is attributable to two ine¢ ciencies. Due to these ine¢ ciencies, introducing a CN
next to a DM, as well as increasing the transparency level not necessarily produce greater
overall welfare.
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Welfare1 Introduction
An open issue in market microstructure is how investors behave when an asset trades simul-
taneously on several markets that may show a di⁄erent degree of transparency. The topics of
competition between markets and the optimal degree of transparency have become even more
relevant in recent years, with the emergence of Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs). These
ATSs operate next to traditional exchanges and exhibit distinct institutional characteristics.
Therefore, traders face the decision where to trade, taking into account the advantages and
disadvantages of each trading venue.
In this paper, we deal with Crossing Networks (CNs), which are one speci￿c type of ATS.
CNs are de￿ned by the SEC (1998) as ￿systems that allow participants to enter unpriced
orders to buy and sell securities. Orders are crossed at a speci￿ed time at a price derived
from another market￿(i.e. the continuous market). A pioneering CN, both in the US and
on a worldwide level, is ITG￿ s POSIT.1 However, crossing applications could also be found
in di⁄erent environments. Already in 1990, the NYSE had introduced post-close crossing
sessions. Currently, other traditional markets are adding crossing facilities into their market
structure as well; see e.g. Deutsche B￿rse￿ s Xetra XXL in September 2001 or the NASDAQ
Crossing Network in May 2007. Further, also investment banks now opt to pool institutional
order ￿ ow into CNs as a response to new regulatory initiatives, such as Regulation NMS in
the US and MiFID in Europe (see e.g. the Block Interest Discovery Service (BIDS)).
Despite the prevalence of CNs next to continuous markets, the dynamic aspects and
welfare implications of the coexistence of these systems have not yet been well explored. This
paper aims to ￿ll this gap and addresses two important policy questions that also relate to
long-standing issues within the market microstructure literature. First, where do investors
trade when there are multiple trading venues for a single asset? More speci￿cally, we consider
the choice between a CN and a continuous dealer market (DM) under di⁄erent degrees of
transparency. Second, what is the optimal organization and structure of ￿nancial markets?
In particular, we study whether coexistence of a CN and a DM creates added value in terms
of welfare and investigate the optimal transparency level when markets coexist.
Our model for studying traders￿order submission strategies starts from that in Parlour
(1998). While she models a limit order market, we deal with sequentially arriving traders who
are able to choose between a CN and a DM. When both trading systems coexist, traders can
1ITG￿ s POSIT is used by approximately 550 major institutions and broker/dealers and crossed about 35
million US shares per day in November 2005, according to Towergroup. The total market volume amounted
to 98 million shares per day in the same period, as compared to almost 1.8 billion for the NYSE.
1obtain guaranteed execution in the DM, opt for cheaper but (possibly) uncertain execution
on the CN, or refrain from trading. An important feature of the competition between CNs
and traditional markets is that they o⁄er a di⁄erent degree of transparency (see e.g. Bloom-
￿eld and O￿ Hara (2000)). Whereas traditional markets may vary in their degree of mandated
transparency, Regulations ATS and NMS in the US and MiFID in Europe do not require
CNs to provide information about their order book. We therefore investigate how di⁄erent
degrees of transparency at both markets in￿ uence traders￿order submission strategies and
a⁄ect welfare. More speci￿cally, we develop the analysis for three di⁄erent informational set-
tings: transparency, ￿partial￿opaqueness and ￿complete￿opaqueness. Transparency occurs
when traders are fully informed about the past order ￿ ow at both markets. Hence, before de-
termining their trading strategy, they observe the prevailing CN net order imbalance, i.e. the
di⁄erence between the number of buy and sell orders in the CN order book. In reality, how-
ever, CNs are rather opaque. We incorporate this by analyzing partial opaqueness: traders
only observe previous trades at the DM. Complete opaqueness implies that both markets are
opaque such that traders are uninformed about past CN and DM order ￿ ow.
We summarize our main ￿ndings around the two policy questions that we address. The
￿rst set of results relates to order submission strategies and order ￿ ow patterns. Common to
the three informational settings, CN and DM are shown to cater for di⁄erent types of traders:
investors with a higher willingness to trade are more inclined to trade at a DM. Further, we
￿nd that the CN￿ s order ￿ ow increases when an asset exhibits a higher ￿relative spread￿(i.e.
a higher bid-ask spread in proportion to its underlying value). Moreover, the existence of a CN
results in ￿order creation￿due to the participation of ￿CN-only traders￿ : investors who have
a relatively lower willingness to trade submit orders to a CN, whereas they would never trade
at a DM. We also ￿nd a ￿trade diversion￿e⁄ect, which occurs because the introduction of a
CN causes some trades to be diverted away from the DM to the CN. A key result of our paper
is that the transparency and partial opaqueness settings generate systematic patterns in order
￿ ow. In particular, current CN order ￿ ow stimulates the arrival of future CN counterparties.
In addition, current CN order ￿ ow hinders future CN orders on the same market side. The
intuition for our key result is that the net order imbalance created by the current order is
more (less) favorable for future orders on the opposite (same) market side, which is re￿ ected
in their respective execution probabilities. Under complete opaqueness, these patterns do not
arise because traders do not observe any order ￿ ow. Although this result for transparency is
reminiscent of the ￿ndings in Parlour (1998) for a limit order market, two major di⁄erences
2exist. First, in Parlour￿ s model both market and limit orders have implications for future order
￿ ow. In our model, by contrast, only CN orders produce systematic patterns in order ￿ ow.
Secondly, we show that the transparency level of the CN and the DM a⁄ects the nature of the
order ￿ ow patterns. The result that order ￿ ow is informative about execution probabilities
is novel to the market microstructure literature. The reasoning for this informativeness of
order ￿ ow is that, when markets are partially opaque, observing no order ￿ ow relative to
a DM trade may be perceived as good news for a successive CN order as it increases the
likelihood of a counterparty in the book. However, no order may also be perceived as bad
news when it entails the preemption of a successive CN order. Overall, these theoretical
insights point to a time-varying order ￿ ow at a CN and trade ￿ ow at a DM, even in the
absence of asymmetric information. This has important policy implications for supervisory
authorities that are attempting to correctly infer the presence of informed trading. Further,
these insights need to be accounted for when measuring ￿normal￿order ￿ ow.
Our second set of results concerns welfare. We build on previous work that studies
welfare and the optimal degree of transparency (see e.g. Pagano and Roºll (1996), Glosten
(1998), Bloom￿eld and O￿ Hara (2000), Viswanathan and Wang (2002), Parlour and Seppi
(2003), Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005), and Rindi (2007)). Our paper complements
this literature by considering the impact of transparency on welfare when coexisting trading
systems compete for uninformed order ￿ ow. We compare welfare for a CN and DM in
isolation, as well as for coexisting markets to that of a ￿ctitious market without ine¢ ciencies,
producing maximum welfare. The employed measure is ￿overall￿welfare, which accounts for
the gains from trade of all parties involved (including dealers). A ￿rst result is that a CN
in isolation o⁄ers greater overall welfare than a DM in isolation if the execution probability
at the CN and the relative spread are high. Second, coexistence of a CN and a DM only
generates higher overall welfare than a DM in isolation for assets with a high relative spread.
Third, under coexistence, transparency outranks both opaqueness settings for assets with a
high relative spread. However, the opposite result is obtained with a low relative spread.
Focusing next on the discrepancy with the maximum overall welfare benchmark, we ￿nd
it is driven by two main ine¢ ciencies, which in turn hinge on coexistence and the level of
transparency. The ￿rst ine¢ ciency concerns the foregone welfare potential from trades by
￿CN-only traders￿ , labelled as the ￿CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency￿ . This ine¢ ciency is largest
for a DM in isolation where these CN-only traders do not participate, lowest for a CN in
isolation where all traders can only participate in the CN, and intermediate for coexistence.
3Transparency reduces the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency as counterparties are more attracted
to the CN. The second ine¢ ciency stems from traders diverting to the CN while also being
willing to trade at the DM, and is labelled ￿CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency￿ . Diverting
traders do not take into account all gains from trade as they maximize their individual trad-
ing gains only. With a DM in isolation, this ine¢ ciency is zero, whereas it is at its maximum
for a CN in isolation. The CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency increases in the degree of trans-
parency only for liquid stocks, i.e. stocks with a low relative spread. Our welfare ￿ndings
have important policy implications. Coexistence and greater transparency do not necessarily
improve overall welfare. In addition, asking for more transparency may be bene￿cial for one
set of traders but not for others.
Further, our paper is related to two recent strands of research. A ￿rst line of work
develops dynamic microstructure models for a limit order market (see e.g. Harris (1998),
Foucault (1999), Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005), Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005),
and Rosu (2005)).2 Our paper contributes to this line of research as we introduce a dynamic
microstructure model to study (partly, at least) endogenous liquidity supply when two dif-
ferent trading venues compete. The limit order market model in Parlour (1998) is positioned
closest to ours. However, a number of important di⁄erences exist. First, we analyze the
optimal order submission strategies and the consequences for welfare when traders choose
between two trading venues that have di⁄erent institutional characteristics, whereas Parlour
(1998) considers the choice between market and limit orders within a single market. Second,
given that the cross in the CN occurs at the DM midquote, our model allows for submitting
orders ￿within the spread￿ . Third, while Parlour (1998) deals with transparency (which is
the case for most limit order markets), we also consider two opaqueness settings. Finally,
the models￿resulting dynamics feature some important di⁄erences. In our model, only a CN
order generates systematic patterns in order ￿ ow, whereas in Parlour (1998) both market and
limit orders have an impact.
A second line of recent work models competition between ￿nancial markets when assets
trade at multiple markets (see e.g. Glosten (1994), Parlour and Seppi (2003), and Foucault
and Menkveld (2007)).3 Recently, a few papers have studied explicitly the interaction between
2Note that static equilibrium models of the limit order book are much more common. Examples include
Glosten (1994), Chakravarty and Holden (1995), Rock (1996), and Seppi (1997).
3In particular, the seminal contribution is provided by Glosten (1994), who considers the design of pure limit
order markets to analyze their competitive viability. Parlour and Seppi (2003) extend this model by focusing
on competition between a pure limit order market and a hybrid market. Foucault and Menkveld (2007) deal
with order submission at two pure limit order markets when a fraction of brokers apply Smart Order Routing
Technologies (SORT). Other work on the competition between trading systems includes Glosten (1998), Santos
and Scheinkman (2001), Di Noia (2001), Viswanathan and Wang (2002), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006),
4a CN and a DM. Existing models, however, consider a static environment to analyze this
competition. Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) develop a model in which informed and
uninformed traders decide simultaneously to submit orders to one of the two markets in
order to analyze the e⁄ect of the introduction of a CN next to a DM. Expanding on this
paper, D￿nges and Heinemann (2006) focus on game-theoretic re￿nements to accommodate
the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination game. We contribute to this line of work
because we explicitly introduce dynamics into the analysis. These dynamics are important: a
typical characteristic of a CN is that it ￿matches￿orders at a speci￿ed time during the trading
day, while the other market operates simultaneously in a continuous fashion. In particular,
traders arrive sequentially, and their submission strategy is determined both by the current
CN book (when transparent) and by their expectations of the behavior of future traders.
There are by now a substantial number of empirical papers that analyze the interaction
between trading systems (for an overview, see Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005)). However,
papers that investigate empirically the impact of a CN on other trading systems are still
rather scarce. Gresse (2006) studies the impact of ITG￿ s POSIT on the DM segment of the
London Stock Exchange. She ￿nds that POSIT has a share of the total trading volume of
about one to two percent in these stocks, but that its probability of execution is still low (2-
4%). Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003) use proprietary data of US institutional investors
who choose between trading platforms. They ￿nd that realized execution costs are generally
lower on CNs. N￿s and Skjeltorp (2003) and N￿s and ￿degaard (2006) focus on orders from
the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund that are ￿rst sent to a CN and then, in the case
of non-execution, to brokers. They also ￿nd lower CN trading costs but argue that these may
be o⁄set fully by the non-trading costs due to adverse selection, which are implicitly present
at the CN. Finally, Fong, Madhavan and Swan (2004) focus on the impact of block trades on
di⁄erent trading venues. They ￿nd that competition from a CN imposes no adverse e⁄ect on
the liquidity of the limit order book.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the
model. Section 3 provides an analysis of the two markets in isolation. Next, Section 4 studies
their coexistence. In this section, we ￿rst consider transparency and then turn to two degrees
of opaqueness: partial and complete. Section 5 o⁄ers a discussion of the welfare implications
of our model. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are given in Appendix A.
and Foucault and Parlour (2004).
52 Setup of the Model
The model we develop adapts that in Parlour (1998) to analyze dynamic competition between
two trading systems. In our economy, there are two goods: consumption on day 1 and on day
2, denoted by C1 and C2, respectively. Agents are risk neutral and di⁄er in their preferences
over consumption of these two goods. These preferences are given by the following utility
function:
U (C1;C2;￿) = C1 + ￿C2 (1)
where ￿ is the subjective preference or type of the agent re￿ ecting her personal trade-o⁄
between current and future consumption. Next to these two goods, C1 and C2, an asset
exists that pays out V units of C2 on day 2. Thus, V can be interpreted as the underlying
or fundamental value of the asset. During the ￿rst day, the trading day, claims to the asset
can be exchanged for C1. Prices in the market are exchange ratios C1=C2. Agents can then
construct their preferred consumption path by trading claims to this asset. The trading day
consists of T periods, indexed by t = 1;:::;T. In each period, exactly one agent (also referred
to as trader) arrives in the market, and each agent arrives at most once. The arriving agent at
time t is characterized by two elements. First, her initial endowment determines her trading
orientation. With probability ￿b, she is a buyer and has a unit of the asset she can buy, which
we denote by 1. With probability ￿s = 1 ￿ ￿b, she is a seller and has a unit of the asset
she can sell, ￿1. Second, the agent arriving at t has a type ￿t, which is drawn from an i.i.d.





where we assume 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿. This ￿t, which appears as well in the utility function above,
could also be seen as a re￿ ection of the time t agent￿ s willingness to trade.4 In particular, if
the agent is a buyer, she will be more eager to buy if she has a high beta. Conversely, a seller
will be more eager to sell if she has a low ￿t. In order to see this, assume that the arriving
agent is a buyer. Buying the asset yields ￿tV . She compares this value with the price in the
market and buys if the price (which is denominated in units of C1) is lower than the value she
attaches to the asset. If ￿t is high, she attaches more weight to consumption on the second
day and hence will be more eager to trade than if ￿t is low. The reasoning is that the trading
gains are higher in the former case. Similarly, a seller with a low beta will be more eager to
sell, because she prefers consumption on the ￿rst day.
4Alternatively, Parlour (1998) argues that ￿t can be interpreted as a subjective valuation of the asset, or
an agent-speci￿c prior over the next day￿ s asset value V . Hence, the market becomes a private values auction,
as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
6Traders can choose between submitting an order to a dealer market (DM) or to a crossing
network (CN), or not submit an order at all. We assume that competition between dealers
on the DM is su¢ ciently intense such that the spread is one tick, that is A ￿ B = 1, with
A the ask price and B the bid price and A > V > B. The one-tick assumption allows us
to focus on the interaction between markets, abstracting from strategic interactions between
dealers. At the same time, a one-tick spread represents the most competitive position for the
DM when competing with a CN.5 Dealer bid and ask quotes do not move during the trading
day. The implication is that buyers can always buy at a price A, the price at which a dealer
is willing to sell. Sellers who are looking for immediacy in the DM obtain B.
On the CN, we assume that the matching of orders (the ￿cross￿ ) takes place at the end
of the trading day (that is, after the action of the agent arriving in period T) and that this
matching occurs according to time priority. The price of the cross is derived from the bid
and ask in the DM and equals the midquote A+B
2 . Given our assumptions, orders at the
CN face no price uncertainty. All orders submitted to the CN are stored in the CN book.
Due to time priority, the only variable relevant to traders for this book is the amount of net
unful￿lled orders or the ￿net order imbalance￿ , nt, i.e. the di⁄erence between the amounts
of previously submitted buy and sell orders. When nt > 0 (< 0) there are more buy (sell)
orders than sell (buy) orders in the CN book before the order at time t. After the action of
the trader at time t, there are three possible evolutions of the net order imbalance:
nt+1 =
nt + 1 trader t submits a buy order to the CN
nt ￿ 1 trader t submits a sell order to the CN
nt trader t submits no order to the CN
: (2)
Note that nt+1 = nt may stem from a trade at a dealer or from not trading at all at time
t. Once submitted, orders cannot be modi￿ed or cancelled. This means that orders remain
in the CN book until the cross. Order execution is determined by the ￿nal net imbalance
between the queue of buy orders and the queue of sell orders. De￿ne nT+1 as the CN book
at the time of the cross, then if nT+1 = 0, meaning no imbalance, all submitted orders
are executed. If nT+1 < 0; given time priority, the last jnT+1j submitted sell orders remain
5Bessembinder (2003) ￿nds average (volume-weighted) quoted spreads on NASDAQ equal to 1.77 cents
(with the tick size being 1 cent), which is relatively close to our one-tick assumption. More generally, this ￿one
tick￿should not be interpreted literally, but rather taken as a metaphor for the most competitive situation in
which competition between dealers have driven the inside spread to its minimum level. As will be shown later,
it is the relative spread that matters for submission strategies of agents. For example, saving the half-spread in
the CN is more valuable when the bid is $1 and the ask $1.01, than if they are $100 and $100.01, respectively
(assuming that the common tick size is one cent).
7unexecuted. If nT+1 > 0, the last nT+1 buy orders remain unexecuted. It goes without saying
that time priority in￿ uences the order submission strategies of the traders. In practice, some
CNs indeed implement a time priority rule. Examples include the Crossing Session I at the
NYSE (rule 904 of SR-NYSE-90-52), ITG￿ s POSIT-Now which o⁄ers a continuous intraday
CN (implicitly granting time priority) and Xetra XXL employing a volume/time priority rule.
Other CNs are often reluctant to share information on their matching procedure and may
use di⁄erent matching procedures like pro-rata systems.
We consider three informational settings: transparency, complete opaqueness and partial
opaqueness. Common to the three settings, a trader arriving at time t knows her trading
orientation (buyer or seller), her own ￿t, the bid and ask price of the dealer (B and A), the
distribution of ￿ (F (￿)), the distribution of buyers and sellers (￿b and ￿s), and the length
of the trading day (T). With transparency, traders also observe past CN order ￿ ow and thus
know the net order imbalance (nt) in the CN, as well as past DM trades. In contrast, with
complete opaqueness traders do not observe any order ￿ ow, whereas with partial opaqueness,
traders only observe DM trades. In the two opaqueness settings, traders therefore need to
form expectations about nt.
3 Markets in Isolation
Within this section, we successively consider the equilibria for a DM and a CN in isolation.
This approach allows us to gain insight into the model and the structure and functioning of
each market. Do note that the informational setting does not in￿ uence the outcomes of the
derived equilibria. Therefore, there is no need to explicitly indicate the informational setting
with markets in isolation.
We ￿rst consider a DM in isolation. In this case, a trader submits an order to the DM as
long as this yields a positive pro￿t; otherwise, she prefers not to trade. The trader￿ s pro￿t of
a buy order is the di⁄erence between her valuation ￿tV and the price paid A, i.e. ￿tV ￿ A.
Similarly, for a sell order, the pro￿t is B ￿ ￿tV . From these pro￿ts, the cuto⁄ values, i.e.
the values for ￿t at which a trader is indi⁄erent between submitting no order and trade at
the DM, are computed as A
V for a buyer and B
V for a seller. These cuto⁄ values could be
interpreted in the following way. A buyer arriving at t who has a ￿t higher than A
V will buy
at the DM; all the others will not. In turn, when the trader at t is a seller, she will only sell
at the DM if her ￿t is smaller than B
V . The order submission strategies are depicted in Panel
8A of Figure 1. Note that traders who have a ￿t between B
V and A
V never submit an order,
regardless of their trading orientation.
We now turn to a CN in isolation. A trader submits a CN order as long as this results
in a positive expected pro￿t. We need to consider expected pro￿ts as the execution of a CN
order may not be certain. If the order executes, the trader￿ s pro￿t is the di⁄erence between










t the expected probability of execution. The ￿rst and second
superscript denote the trading orientation (b) and the considered market in isolation (CN),









t the probability of execution of a sell order submitted





t (nt)), but for notational convenience we suppress this dependence.6 The reasoning
behind this dependence is that if a trader makes the net order imbalance more pronounced
by joining the ￿longer￿side of the book, enough future orders need to arrive at the ￿shorter￿
side of the book to obtain execution. This is more likely earlier on the trading day, when
there are still a lot of periods to come. When the expected pro￿t of a CN order is negative,
the trader chooses to abstain, which results in zero pro￿ts. Solving for ￿t, both for a buyer
and a seller, we ￿nd that the cuto⁄ value - the value of ￿t at which a trader is indi⁄erent
between submitting a CN order and no order - equals A+B
2V . Hence, a buyer (seller) arriving
at t will submit a CN buy (sell) order if her ￿t is higher (lower) than A+B
2V . To be complete,
these cuto⁄values hold if the respective execution probability is strictly positive. If it is zero,
a trader is indi⁄erent between a CN order and no order, because both yield zero pro￿t. If
this occurs, we assume that traders prefer to abstain.7 The order submission strategies are
summarized in Panel B of Figure 1. Note that, in contrast with a DM in isolation, there is
no range of betas where neither a buyer nor a seller submits an order. The reasoning is that
a CN does not have a spread, whereas a DM is characterized by a one-tick spread.
Please insert Figure 1 around here.
6Note that, next to the state variable nt, execution probabilities also depend on F (:), ￿b, ￿s and the time
left until the end of the trading day T ￿ t.
7Under complete or partial opaqueness, traders may not know that the execution probabilities are zero.
However, whether or not they participate does not in￿ uence the number of trades on the CN. Therefore, the
informational setting does not a⁄ect the equilibrium outcome.
94 Coexistence of Markets
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium order submission strategies when a CN and a
DM coexist. We ￿rst consider transparency, i.e. traders observe past CN order ￿ ow (and thus
know the net order imbalance in the CN), as well as past DM trades. Subsequently, we analyze
opaqueness, i.e. when traders do not observe any order ￿ ow (complete opaqueness) or only
DM trades (partial opaqueness). The methodology is identical in all settings. For a trader
arriving at time t we calculate a cuto⁄ ￿t at which she is indi⁄erent between two strategies,
rationally anticipating the impact of her order on execution probabilities. Furthermore, we
develop empirical predictions on order ￿ ow dynamics.
For all variables, we denote the informational setting by the subscript i = tr;co or po,
indicating transparency, complete or partial opaqueness, respectively. Adding a superscript
re￿ ecting coexistence of a CN and a DM, as was done for the isolation cases, now becomes
redundant because the informational setting￿ s subscript su¢ ciently indicates that coexistence
of markets is considered.
4.1 Transparency
4.1.1 Equilibrium
The time t trader chooses between three possible strategies. First, she can initiate a trade
at the dealer; such an order has a guaranteed, immediate execution. Second, she could opt
for submitting an order to the CN. This would yield a better price as it allows the trader to
save the half-spread. With such an order, however, she might face the risk of non-execution.
Execution is certain when, upon arrival, she faces a favorable net order imbalance; otherwise,
the probability that the order will be executed is lower than one. Third, she can refrain
from trading when it yields a negative (expected) pro￿t. Denote the strategy of a buyer who
arrives at time t under transparency (tr) by ￿b
t;tr (nt;￿t) and of a seller by ￿s
t;tr (nt;￿t) where
the notation stresses that the strategy depends on the time t CN￿ s net order imbalance, nt,
and the trader￿ s type ￿t. Note that these strategies hinge on time and are non-stationary.
The setup of this model can be seen as a stochastic sequential game. Moreover, due to
the recursive nature of the game, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist and this equilibrium
is unique (because traders are indi⁄erent between choices with zero probability). Applying
the approach introduced above to solve the trader￿ s choice problem, i.e. computing cuto⁄
values for ￿t at which traders are indi⁄erent between two strategies, Proposition 1 states the
10resulting equilibrium strategies of a trader arriving at t.






































t;tr (nt;￿t) = 1DM (buy at DM)
: (3)





































t;tr (nt;￿t) = 0 (no order)
: (4)
Proof. See Appendix A.
In this proposition, ￿1DM￿denotes a buy at the DM (which transacts at the ask), and
￿￿1DM" a sell at the DM (transacting at the bid). Similarly, ￿1CN￿and ￿￿1CN￿stand for
a buy and sell order to the CN, respectively. Employing our one-tick spread assumption,
A ￿ B = 1, we ￿nd that the cuto⁄ ￿t of a buyer who is indi⁄erent between an order to the




































, the cuto⁄ ￿t at which a buyer is indi⁄erent between a CN buy order and no



































































The equilibrium order submission strategies are summarized in Figure 2 (for i = tr).
Comparing this graph with Panels A and B in Figure 1, do note that due to altering execution
probabilities some cuto⁄ values become dynamic and may change every period t. Further,
compared to the DM in isolation, order creation occurs stemming from CN-only traders:










now submit orders to the CN,
whereas they would never participate at the DM. Such order creation, induced by the CN,
is con￿rmed empirically by Gresse (2006). The CN also introduces competition for the DM
as it may divert trades away from the DM.8 The welfare implications of both order creation
and trade diversion will be discussed in Section 5.
Please insert Figure 2 around here.
It is clear that if the execution probability at the CN is larger, an arriving trader is
more likely to opt for a CN order. This execution probability is a crucial element in the
choice between a CN order and a DM trade as it determines expected pro￿ts. When trader t
submits a CN order, she changes the net order imbalance in the CN. This a⁄ects the execution
probabilities of future CN orders and hence also the strategies chosen by future traders. When
determining her optimal strategy, trader t must take these e⁄ects of her order into account.
Proposition 2 shows how the CN￿ s net order imbalance in￿ uences execution probabilities.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, at any time t for any net order imbalance nt, if the CN￿ s net
order imbalance is one unit higher, then the probability of execution of a buy (sell) order will
be lower (higher). If the CN￿ s net order imbalance is one unit lower, then the probability of
execution of a buy (sell) order will be higher (lower). Hence, 8 nt; t;
(i) pb
t;tr (nt ￿ 1) ￿ pb
t;tr (nt) ￿ pb
t;tr (nt + 1)
(ii) ps
t;tr (nt ￿ 1) ￿ ps
t;tr (nt) ￿ ps
t;tr (nt + 1)
: (9)
Proof. See Appendix A.
8Note that both e⁄ects could lead to overall trade creation but also to overall trade reduction. The reason
that there might be trade reduction is that some of the investors who would choose to trade at the DM, were
it to operate in isolation, might now opt for the CN, at which their order may remain un￿lled.
12Proposition 2 argues that a trader faces intertemporal competition from earlier traders of
the same orientation already present in the CN book. The reasoning is as follows. Suppose
that a buyer arrives at time t and nt ￿ ￿1.9 Then, if the net order imbalance is one unit
higher, i.e. nt+1, because there is either one additional buy order or one less sell order in the
CN book, an additional CN order at the sell side must arrive in order to obtain execution.
This lowers the execution probability compared to when there is a smaller imbalance.
Further, do note that execution probabilities only depend on the net order imbalance, and
not on the individual length of the buy and sell queue in the CN book. This is in contrast with
a limit order market as presented in Parlour (1998). In such a market, execution probabilities
are in￿ uenced even when both queues are one unit longer or shorter.
4.1.2 Empirical Predictions on Order Flow Dynamics
We now analyze order ￿ ow patterns and present them in two propositions. In each propo-
sition, we depart from a given nt, and from a speci￿c order, a DM trade or a CN order
submitted by the time t trader. We investigate the e⁄ect on the order ￿ ow to the DM and
the CN in the subsequent period. We ￿rst assume that the current order (at time t) is a
DM trade. Denote by Pr[:j:] the conditional probability. Proposition 3 then states that the
probability of occurrence of any type of order at t + 1 (i.e. a DM buy, DM sell, CN buy or
CN sell) does not depend on whether the current transaction is a DM buy or a DM sell.
Proposition 3 Under transparency, trades at the DM do not generate systematic patterns
in order ￿ow. In particular, the probabilities of occurrence of buy orders on the DM and the
CN at time t+1 are independent of whether the trade at time t was a DM buy or a DM sell:
Pr
h
1DM at t + 1j￿b





1DM at t + 1j￿s





1CN at t + 1j￿b





1CN at t + 1j￿s
t;tr (nt;￿t) = ￿1DM;nt
￿
:
A symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
Proof. Contained in the discussion below.
9If nt < ￿1, the execution probability of a CN buy order with a net order imbalance of nt and nt +1 both
equal one.
13The results in Proposition 3 are driven by the following intuition. The CN￿ s net order
imbalance nt+1 remains nt, independently of whether at time t there was a DM buy or a
DM sell. Therefore, for any trader at t + 1 with type ￿t+1, the probabilities of this trader
submitting a buy or sell order to the DM or the CN at time t + 1 is independent of whether
the trade at time t was a DM buy or DM sell. As this applies to any trader of a speci￿c type,
it also holds when aggregating over all types ￿t+1.
However, the conclusions change when we assume that the order at t was a CN order
instead of a DM trade. In this case, we obtain systematic patterns in order ￿ ow although
buyers and sellers arrive randomly. Part a of Proposition 4 shows that a CN buy order at t
is more likely to invite a CN sell order at t + 1, but is more likely to hinder the submission
of a CN buy order at t + 1, compared to when trader t did not submit a CN buy order. In
turn, part b of Proposition 4 shows it becomes more likely that the time t + 1 trade will be
a DM buy if the order at t was a CN buy order than if it was another type of order.
Proposition 4 Under transparency, CN orders generate systematic patterns in order ￿ow.
In particular, it holds that:
a) the probability of a CN buy order occurring at time t+1 is smaller if the order submitted
at time t was a CN buy order than if it was a DM trade (buy or sell). This, in turn, is smaller
than the probability of a CN buy order at t + 1, conditional upon a CN sell order at t:
Pr
h
1CN at t + 1j￿b





1CN at t + 1j￿b
t;tr (nt;￿t) = 1DM or ￿s




1CN at t + 1j￿s
t;tr (nt;￿t) = ￿1CN;nt
￿
;
b) the probability of a DM buy occurring at time t + 1 is greater if the order submitted at
time t was a CN buy order than if it was a DM trade (buy or sell). This, in turn, is greater
than the probability of a DM buy at t + 1, conditional upon a CN sell order at t:
Pr
h
1DM at t + 1j￿b





1DM at t + 1j￿b
t;tr (nt;￿t) = 1DM or ￿s




1DM at t + 1j￿s
t;tr (nt;￿t) = ￿1CN;nt
￿
:
For both a and b, a symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
14Proof. See Appendix A.
The reasoning behind part a of Proposition 4 is as follows. Assume that the t + 1 trader
is a buyer with type ￿t+1 and start from a net order imbalance at t, nt. As argued above,
this trader arriving at t+1 decides where to trade based upon the net order imbalance nt+1,
which determines the expected execution probability at the CN. Clearly, the time t trader￿ s
decision potentially a⁄ects nt+1 and resultingly the execution probability of a CN buy order
submitted at t + 1. More speci￿cally, submitting a CN sell order at t renders nt+1 more
favorable for a buyer arriving at t + 1, whereas submitting a CN buy order at t has the
reverse e⁄ect. Performing a DM buy or sell trade, however, does not a⁄ect nt+1 at all (i.e.
nt = nt+1). As this reasoning applies to a trader of any speci￿c type, it also holds when
aggregating over all types ￿t+1. A similar intuition holds for part b of Proposition 4.
In general, Proposition 4 demonstrates the existence of systematic patterns in order ￿ ow.
This ￿nding is of importance to empirical researchers. The literature tends to attribute such
patterns to informed trading, whereas our model shows that they can also stem from the
interaction between two trading venues. For example, a series of consecutive buy trades at
the DM need not imply that some traders have private information; it might result from
an unfavorable imbalance in the CN book for the buyer. Thus, empirical research focusing
on patterns in DM order ￿ ow (while neglecting the CN) might yield incorrect conclusions.
An interesting empirical application of our model would, therefore, be to determine the
importance of this interaction e⁄ect in explaining order ￿ ow patterns relative to other factors.
Furthermore, note that the CN in our model also exhibits two opposing externalities,
as in Hendershott and Mendelson (2000). On the one hand, a positive (liquidity) external-
ity prevails on the CN because adding an order is bene￿cial to counterparties arriving at
later times; as such, liquidity attracts additional liquidity. On the other hand, a negative
(crowding) externality exists as early arriving low liquidity value traders may preempt higher
liquidity value traders arriving later in the trading day. Hence, these externalities, identi-
￿ed by Hendershott and Mendelson, also hold in a dynamic context in which traders arrive
sequentially instead of simultaneously.
Finally, it is worth stressing that the underlying dynamics behind the patterns outlined
in Propositions 3 and 4 are very di⁄erent from those behind the propositions on order ￿ ow
patterns in Parlour (1998). As argued above, in the case of a limit order market, the individual
lengths of the queues at bid and ask are important. Both market and limit orders alter the
available depth and resultingly the lengths of the queues at these quotes, thus a⁄ecting the
15execution probabilities of subsequent limit orders. As such, both order types in￿ uence the
probabilities of occurrence of subsequent orders and cause systematic patterns in order ￿ ow
to arise. In contrast, within our model, which has both a DM and a CN, it is the net order
imbalance in the CN that is relevant and this imbalance is in￿ uenced only by CN orders, not
by DM trades.
4.2 Opaqueness
With transparency, traders conditioned their strategies on past order ￿ ow and the resulting
observable net order imbalance in the CN book. In reality, however, some CNs are rather
opaque and do not actively disseminate information on their order book. In this subsection,
we adapt our model to capture two degrees of opaqueness, and contrast them to transparency.
Other models of CNs, such as Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) or D￿nges and Heinemann
(2006), cannot compare di⁄erent informational settings, because they deal with simultaneous
order submissions.
4.2.1 Complete Opaqueness
Complete opaqueness implies that a trader no longer observes past DM trades and past CN
order ￿ ow. In order to condition her strategy on the net order imbalance in the CN book, nt,
she needs to form expectations about it. She does so in two steps. First, she is able to solve
any past trader￿ s optimization problem. Combining this with the common knowledge on
F (￿), ￿b and ￿s in a second step allows her to compute the expected net order imbalance in
the CN book at t, formally denoted by Et;co (nt) (where the subscript ￿co￿indicates complete
opaqueness). On the basis of this Et;co (nt), she computes the expected execution probability











if she is a seller.10 As in Subsection 4.1, we suppress the dependence for
notational convenience and denote them in short by pb
t;co and ps
t;co, respectively. Using these


























for a seller. Now denote the optimal strategy of a











then possible to reformulate Proposition 1 for the complete opaqueness setting by replacing
the cuto⁄ betas and strategies with their respective counterparts, de￿ned in the current
subsection. This modi￿ed Proposition 1 characterizes traders￿equilibrium order submission
10Clearly, to derive these probabilities, as in the transparency case, she needs to solve the choice problems
for traders who will arrive at later periods.
16strategies in a setting of complete opaqueness. These strategies are shown in Figure 2 (for
i = co):
4.2.2 Partial Opaqueness
Under ￿partial￿ opaqueness, traders only observe previous DM trades, but not CN order
￿ ow or the net order imbalance in the CN book. This informational setting corresponds
closest to reality as DMs in general exhibit (mandated) transparency, while CNs are rather
opaque. A time t trader thus observes in each past period either a DM buy, a DM sell,
or no trade at the DM. In the latter case, she does not know whether a CN buy, a CN
sell, or no order was submitted. Her information is now clearly richer than under complete
opaqueness, allowing her to form more precise expectations about nt. Denote by Et;po (nt)
the expected net order imbalance for the trader at time t under partial opaqueness (subscript











for a sell order. In short, we denote
these probabilities as pb
t;po and ps



























if she is a seller.
Note that, in contrast to complete opaqueness, these cuto⁄ betas exhibit path dependency.11
In other words, they hinge on past traders￿decisions, which are now partly observed. The











for a seller. Reformulating Proposition 1 for partial opaqueness
characterizes the traders￿equilibrium order submission strategies within this setting. These
strategies are summarized in Figure 2 (for i = po):
4.2.3 Empirical Predictions on Order Flow Dynamics
With complete opaqueness, later arriving traders do not observe previous traders￿strategies
and also anticipate that their own decision will not be revealed to subsequent traders. Re-
sultingly, traders￿decisions become independent of past orders. Each arriving trader will
make decisions using general predictions about past and future traders￿behavior and about
the resulting expected net order imbalance in the CN book. Therefore, and in contrast to the
transparency setting, empirical work that ex post observes the di⁄erent decisions of investors
should not ￿nd path dependency.
11Clearly, however, the cuto⁄ betas under transparency and partial opaqueness are in general not equal,
because the information of the trader at time t di⁄ers in both settings.
17The question then arises whether the systematic patterns in order ￿ ow under transparency
extend to the partial opaqueness setting. Proposition 5 reveals that the answer is ambiguous.
Systematic patterns do also arise under partial opaqueness, but their nature may be di⁄erent
from those under transparency. More speci￿cally, Proposition 5 shows that the probability
of occurrence of a CN buy order at t + 1, after observing a DM trade at t, can be smaller,
equal to, or larger than that after observing no DM trade. As shown in the proof of this
proposition, the resulting patterns depend on the probabilities the trader at t + 1 assigns to
a CN buy, CN sell or no order at t and on her expectations of the CN￿ s net order imbalance.
Complementary, it can become more, equally, or less likely that the trader at t + 1 submits
a DM buy if the time t order was a DM trade, than if no DM trade was observed.
Proposition 5 With partial opaqueness, order ￿ow patterns are ambiguous. In particular,
a) the probability of a CN buy order occurring at t+1 if the order at t was an observed DM
trade (buy or sell) can be smaller, equal to, or larger than that if no DM trade was observed
at t (i.e. ￿s
t;po (Et;po (ct);￿t) = ￿1CN or 0, or ￿b
t;po (Et;po (ct);￿t) = 1CN or 0):
Pr
h













< or = or >
Pr
￿
1CN at t + 1jno DM trade observed at t;Et;po (nt)
￿
;
b) the probability of a DM buy occurring at t+1 if a DM trade (buy or sell) was observed
at t can be smaller, equal to, or larger than that if no DM trade was observed at t (i.e.
￿s
t;po (Et;po (ct);￿t) = ￿1CN or 0, or ￿b
t;po (Et;po (ct);￿t) = 1CN or 0):
Pr
h













< or = or >
Pr
￿
1DM at t + 1jno DM trade observed at t;Et;po (nt)
￿
:
For both a and b, a symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 5 thus shows that systematic patterns in order ￿ ow under partial opaqueness
18may change over time and work in two directions. The intuition for this ￿nding is that
observing no DM trade relative to a DM trade may be ￿good￿news or ￿bad￿news for a
successive CN order. It may be ￿good￿news because observing no DM trade may reveal the
addition of counterparties. It is ￿bad￿news when the observation of no DM trade suggests
that an interesting opportunity at a CN may have been preempted by a time t trader. This
result is in contrast with the patterns in the transparency setting, which were determined
unambiguously. In other words, we ￿nd that the CN￿ s transparency level plays an important
role for order ￿ ow patterns to both the CN and the DM. Changing this institutional property
of the CN may, therefore, a⁄ect order ￿ ow.
5 Welfare Analysis
We organize our welfare analysis as follows. Subsection 5.1 o⁄ers a formal de￿nition of our
overall welfare concept and the ine¢ ciencies we consider. In Subsection 5.2, we discuss overall
welfare for the isolation cases and the coexistence of markets. Next, in Subsection 5.3, the
di⁄erent sources of ine¢ ciencies are further analyzed. Finally, in Subsection 5.4, we highlight
some further considerations regarding welfare and propose some extensions to our analysis.
Throughout all illustrations in this section, we assume that ￿ is uniformly distributed
over [0:8;1:2], ￿b = 0:5 and A+B
2 = V .12 Further, we assume T = 3, i.e. a three-period
trading day. However, our results remain robust when T = 2 or 4; adding more periods only
makes the calculations more complex and does not alter our conclusions.13
5.1 Overall Welfare and Ine¢ ciencies: De￿nitions
Our ex ante welfare measure builds on rational trader behavior. It is therefore identical to
the ￿mean￿ realized ex post welfare. More speci￿cally, the welfare measure we employ is
overall welfare, OW, that is, the sum of all agents￿expected gains from trade (see Glosten
(1998), Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005), or Holli￿eld, Miller, Sandas and Slive (2006) for
a similar approach in de￿ning welfare). In our model, OW consists of both trader welfare
and dealer welfare. The upper bar denotes we consider average per-period overall welfare,
but from now on we use the term ￿overall welfare￿for brevity. We compute OW for the
di⁄erent cases and settings and compare it to the maximum overall welfare OW
max, i.e. the
overall welfare when all buy and sell orders execute with probability one at the midquote.
12Thus, the one-tick spread is assumed to be positioned symmetrically around V . We checked the robustness
of our results by investigating di⁄erent ranges for beta.
13The results of these robustness tests are available upon request from the authors.
19Implicitly, this benchmark measure assumes a counterparty that always provides liquidity at
the midquote and makes zero pro￿t. Hence, OW
max represents a ￿nancial market without
ine¢ ciencies; for example, a DM with dealers who are willing to trade at the midquote, or a





















In this equation, we measure the gains from trade of a buyer and a seller14 trading at
the midquote with execution probability one, and integrate over all participating traders.
In fact, equation (16) clearly indicates why overall welfare in practice may be lower than
OW
max. First, an order at the CN may execute with a probability less than 1, which will
lower the expected gains from trade. Secondly, the set of traders that submit an order
may di⁄er from that in OW
max. We use these insights to de￿ne the two ine¢ ciencies that
drive the wedge between OW
max and the overall welfare in our di⁄erent settings. Note that
Figure 2 is instructive while reading through this subsection because it highlights the three
groups of traders we are distinguishing under coexistence of a DM and CN, as well as the











, (ii) buyers with ￿t 2
￿
A






















, with i = tr, co or po. For the DM
or CN in isolation, we refer to Figure 1.










. We label this ine¢ ciency ￿CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency￿: both under isolation
and coexistence, those traders only participate in the CN, but never in the DM. In the max-
imum overall welfare case, the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency is, by de￿nition, zero because
the orders of these CN-only traders execute with probability one. We will show that the
CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency becomes positive because the average execution probability of
the orders of CN-only traders is smaller than one. Traders can even opt not to participate if
the execution probabilities are zero or if there is no CN.
The second ine¢ ciency relates to those traders opting for the CN when given the choice,
even though they would in fact also be willing to trade at a DM, i.e. buyers with ￿t 2
￿
A










. We label this ine¢ ciency ￿CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency￿ .
These traders￿orders create an ine¢ ciency because the average CN￿ s execution probability
14Recall that we used similar expressions when deriving Proposition 1.
20is less than one. This occurs because, given the choice between DM and CN, CN-diverted
traders may opt for the CN even when the expected execution probability of their order is
less than one. That is, CN-diverted traders trade o⁄the half-spread with the lower execution
probability and opt for the latter. Overall welfare, however, also includes dealers￿pro￿ts,
which are now unrealized for this beta range. By de￿nition, for the overall welfare maximum,
this ine¢ ciency is zero because all orders execute with probability one. The formal de￿nitions
of both ine¢ ciencies are provided in Appendix B.












DM in all settings. All potential gains from trade for these trades are realized such that there
is no overall welfare ine¢ ciency. Prices are simply transfers between traders and dealers.
5.2 Overall Welfare
5.2.1 Maximum Overall Welfare
We present the maximum overall welfare, OW
max, in Figure 3. We observe that OW
max
increases linearly in V because the gains from trade increase linearly in V and the set of
participating traders is independent of V . It can be shown that OW
max does not hinge on
T as per-period welfare is constant, i.e. adding more periods does not a⁄ect the maximum
overall welfare
5.2.2 Markets in Isolation
With a DM in isolation, all submitted orders result in trades. However, buyers with ￿t
lower than A
V and sellers with ￿t higher than B
V do not submit orders (see Panel A of Figure
1). The overall welfare at the DM in isolation, OW
DM, consists of all gains from trade,
including dealer pro￿ts, from all trades. Prices are simply transfers between traders and
dealers. However, they do a⁄ect the participation of traders. A major bene￿t of a DM,
which drives OW
DM, is that traders who have a higher willingness to trade always participate
and that all gains from trade are realized for these trades. Further, OW
DM can be shown
to be independent of the number of periods T. OW
DM is shown in Figure 3, where it is
assumed that the dealer has a ￿ equal to one. Clearly, OW
DM increases in V as more
traders participate and their realized gains per trade at the DM increase with larger V .
Conversely, the overall welfare at a CN in isolation, OW
CN, only stems from trading
gains realized by traders. Whereas all buyers with ￿t higher than A+B
2V and all sellers with ￿t
lower than A+B
2V submit orders to the CN (see Panel B of Figure 1), not all submitted orders
21will result in trades when execution probabilities are smaller than one.15




max in Figure 3, we observe that, as expected, both





max, for all V . The underperformance of the DM in isolation decreases in V
because the smaller relative spread, de￿ned as the bid-ask spread divided by the underlying
value of the asset, induces more traders to participate when V becomes larger. In contrast,
the underperformance of the CN in isolation increases in V because the execution probabilities
are independent from V , implying that more and more gains from trade are unrealized when
V increases and orders are not executed.16
Further, we ￿nd that in terms of overall welfare, the DM performs better than the CN
for higher V , i.e. for assets that have a higher underlying value (or a lower relative spread).
OW
DM is 0 for V < 2:5 as the spread prices the DM out of the market within this region,
whereas the CN still generates welfare.
5.2.3 Coexistence of Markets
We now analyze overall welfare relative to OW
max when traders endogenously route their
orders to the system which maximizes their individual expected gains from trade. The analy-
sis below explores whether coexistence of both trading systems improves overall welfare as
compared to the isolation cases, and further provides insights on the impact of a change in
the informational setting. We denote overall welfare when the CN and the DM coexist un-
der transparency, complete opaqueness and partial opaqueness by OWtr;OWco and OWpo,
respectively. Figure 3 does not include OWco because it visually almost coincides with OWpo.
In Figure 3, we observe three main results. First, as expected, coexistence always gen-
erates lower overall welfare than the maximum overall welfare, OW
max. Second, the overall
welfare of a DM in isolation, OW
DM, outranks coexistence for the three informational set-
tings, except for lower values of V . Coexistence of trading systems therefore does not neces-
sarily improve overall welfare. Third, transparency yields higher overall welfare than partial
15Interestingly, OW
CN
can be shown to increase in the number of periods T because a higher number of
periods produces positive liquidity externalities on the expected execution probabilities.
16As OW
CN




could be expected to decrease should
the trading day consist of more than three periods. Given that OW
DM





remains constant in T.
22opaqueness only for low values of V . Indeed, we notice in Figure 3 that OWpo and OWtr
intersect for V around 7:5. A similar result applies when comparing OWco to OWpo where
OWco is smaller than OWpo for small V but larger for high V . This con￿rms the result that
greater opaqueness results in increased overall welfare for higher V . In the next subsection,
we study the major factors that drive these results.
5.3 The Role of Ine¢ ciencies
5.3.1 Markets in Isolation
With a DM in isolation, the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency is at its maximum because these
traders do not participate. Panel A of Figure 4 shows that the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency
with a DM in isolation decreases in V . The reasoning is that there are less CN-only traders
and that these buyers￿(sellers￿ ) beta is lower (higher) with greater V . In turn, with a CN
in isolation, the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency is positive and takes intermediate values: the
CN-only traders participate but the average execution probability is less than one. The lower
the average execution probability, the greater the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency.17
Consider now the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency as depicted in Panel B of Figure 4. This
ine¢ ciency equals zero for a DM in isolation. This is because the set of CN-diverted traders
by de￿nition is empty. In contrast, with a CN in isolation, all buyers with a ￿t 2
￿A
V ; ￿ ￿
￿
and





are evidently CN-diverted and induce an overall welfare ine¢ ciency
because their orders might not ￿nd a counterparty. This ine¢ ciency increases in V for two
reasons. First, the set of CN-diverted traders relatively increases for larger V . Second,
traders￿welfare losses from non-execution increase when V becomes larger.
The sum of both ine¢ ciencies (CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency and CN-diverted-traders in-





respectively, as depicted in Figure 3. Given that the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency is zero
for a DM in isolation, the di⁄erence between OW
DM and OW
max is driven solely by the
CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency. In contrast, the di⁄erence between OW
max and OW
CN is at-
tributed to both ine¢ ciencies. A comparison of Panels A and B in Figure 4 shows that for
a CN in isolation, the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency is higher than the CN-only-traders
ine¢ ciency for su¢ ciently high V .
Please insert Figure 4 around here.
17The average execution probability increases when more counterparties are present in the system. This
happens, for example, when T increases.
235.3.2 Coexistence of Markets
Figure 3 revealed that coexistence and transparency not necessarily improve overall welfare.
To improve our understanding of this result, we study how coexistence and transparency
a⁄ect the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency and the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency.
The impact of coexistence We ￿rst discuss the impact of coexistence on the CN-diverted-
traders ine¢ ciency. This ine¢ ciency is strictly positive when the markets coexist and is,
therefore, larger than the ine¢ ciency for a DM in isolation (which was zero). In turn, with
coexistence, the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency is lower than for a CN in isolation. Indeed,












) are not forced to go to the CN and opt for the DM, which lowers
the created welfare ine¢ ciency. Further, we observe that the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency
under coexistence exhibits an inverse U-shape in V . Before explaining this non-linearity, note
that the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency is zero both in the absence of trade diversion and
with ￿complete￿ trade diversion featuring execution probabilities equal to one. The CN-
diverted-traders ine¢ ciency is positive for any degree of trade diversion featuring execution
probabilities lower than one. Panel B of Figure 4 displays the inverse U-shape in V . The
CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency is zero when V < 2:5 because there is no trade diversion in
this region.18 Next, we notice an increase of the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency for higher
V : there is complete trade diversion with relatively low execution probabilities. The CN-
diverted-traders ine¢ ciency declines again when V is su¢ ciently high because more traders
tend to prefer the DM at higher values of V . In sum, we ￿nd that due to trade diversion,
the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency is greater under coexistence than in a DM in isolation.
However, this ine¢ ciency is less under coexistence than in a CN in isolation, due to less
traders being diverted.
Next, the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency is quite high for low values of V and coincides
with that of the CN in isolation. It tends towards zero for higher V as this set of traders
becomes relatively less important and their willingness to trade decreases. When the two
trading systems coexist, the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency is lower than for a DM in isolation,
where this ine¢ ciency was at its maximum, but greater than for a CN in isolation. This
latter result stems from the fact that now less trade diversion of interesting counterparties
occurs than in a CN in isolation, which lowers the execution probability of CN-only traders.
18With V < 2:5, the DM prices itself out of the market, which entails that no traders can be diverted from
the DM to the CN.
24The sum of the e⁄ects of both ine¢ ciencies determines the impact of coexistence on
overall welfare. Coexistence only leads to higher welfare than a DM in isolation for low
values of V : the decrease in the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency then dominates the modestly
positive CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency since execution probabilities at the CN are quite
high. The opposite holds for higher V . As compared to a CN in isolation, the CN-only-
traders ine¢ ciency increases when the two trading systems coexist, but the CN-diverted-
traders ine¢ ciency falls. However, the sum of the two ine¢ ciencies is less than in a CN in
isolation.
The impact of opaqueness Figure 3 showed that transparency does not necessarily out-
perform opaqueness when trading systems coexist. Indeed, transparency is only better at low
values of V . We now analyze this result further by studying how transparency a⁄ects the two
ine¢ ciencies, as illustrated in the two Panels of Figure 4.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows that the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency decreases as the degree
of transparency increases. This is because transparency invites counterparties to the CN
as more traders divert to the CN (i.e. the liquidity externality of the CN). This increased
order ￿ ow leads to the orders created by the CN having a greater execution probability, thus
reducing the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency. Hence, completely transparent markets are most
bene￿cial for this segment of traders.
The CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency, in contrast, does not decrease unambiguously as the
degree of transparency increases. This ine¢ ciency falls as the degree of transparency increases
only when V is small. While diverted trades imply with certainty that dealers do not earn
the spread, they only yield welfare for the executed part of the CN order ￿ ow. With complete
and partial opaqueness and small V , traders may expect attractive execution probabilities
of their orders and therefore still divert to the CN even though no orders are present in the
CN book (which was invisible to these traders). Transparency prevents these ex post wrong
paths from taking place, which entails that the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency is lower as
trade diversion occurs more when execution probabilities are very large. That is, for low
V , transparency induces either complete trade diversion with high execution probabilities in
certain contingencies or no trade diversion at all in other contingencies, whereas opaqueness
tends to induce intermediate trade diversion combined with lower execution probabilities.
However, for higher V , in the initial period, transparency induces relatively large trade di-
version because diverted traders know that their orders are visible to arriving counterparties.
25More trade diversion combined with relatively low execution probabilities, however, may be
harmful for overall welfare. This happens with transparency and at large values of V .
5.4 Further Welfare Considerations and Extensions
We ￿rst decompose overall welfare into trading gains realized by traders and by dealers, as
shown in Figure 5. It is clear that in contrast to the overall welfare case, now prices do
not simply cancel out as they a⁄ect both trader and dealer welfare, more speci￿cally in an
opposite way.
Panel A in Figure 5 presents the average per-period trader welfare for the two isolation
cases and two informational settings under coexistence (again complete opaqueness is visu-
ally close to partial opaqueness and therefore omitted). We obtain two main results. First,
coexistence always produces greater trader welfare than the DM in isolation as it widens
traders￿opportunity sets. Second, a greater degree of transparency increases trader welfare
unambiguously because traders anticipate their orders will be revealed to potential coun-
terparties.19 This contrasts with the ￿nding for overall welfare, where a larger degree of
transparency only resulted in higher OW at low values of V .
Next, Panel B of Figure 5 displays average per-period dealer welfare. First, note that
dealer welfare is obviously highest in the case of the DM in isolation because trading at the
DM is then at its maximum. Under coexistence, part of the order ￿ ow is diverted to the CN,
which results in lower dealer welfare. Secondly, dealer welfare is higher under transparency
for relatively low values of V only. Then, trade diversion is relatively minor, because traders
opt for the DM when they are informed about the lack of counterparties at the CN.
In sum, while traders jointly prefer more transparency, dealers do not necessarily agree
because they only desire a higher degree of transparency for low values of V .
Please insert Figure 5 around here.
Finally, our main model can be extended in many ways. A particularly interesting ex-
tension concerns traders who may have single or multiple units to trade. Two cases can be
considered. The ￿rst is where the traders￿choice of trading system is made before knowing
their order size (as in Viswanathan and Wang (2002)). This implies that orders cannot be
19This ￿nding implies that a CN that maximizes the welfare of those trading on its system should become
more transparent. While CNs are typically quite opaque in practice, in line with this result, we recently
observed that some CNs have become more transparent. Examples include BIDS and ITG￿ s POSIT-Now with
BLOCKalert, which reveal the arrival of potential counterparties to the investor community.
26split such that our main ￿ndings are only a⁄ected in a rather straightforward way (i.e. larger
orders a⁄ect execution probabilities and therefore the choice between CN and DM). The sec-
ond case is where traders who have a multiple-unit order can engage in order splitting. In
our analysis, order splitting implies choosing for di⁄erent trading systems. This case becomes
increasingly more complex as the state space expands, because some traders may have one
unit whereas others have multiple units. To identify the impact of trading multiple units and
the potential issue of order splitting, consider a stylized two-period trading day in which all
traders are exposed to identical multiple-unit orders. We argue that most of our results re-
main una⁄ected for transparency and complete opaqueness as traders are risk neutral. More
speci￿cally, in transparent markets, traders￿order submission strategies will not change com-
pared to our previous analysis. This is because it is always optimal for a ￿rst-period trader
to put the entire multiple-unit order either on the CN or the DM. Her decision is una⁄ected
as the order is revealed publicly and the ￿good￿ counterparty will ￿nd it optimal to take
either the entire order or no unit at all. With complete opaqueness, equivalently, the traders￿
strategies are una⁄ected by order size as traders are risk neutral. Technically, the system of
equations to be solved is independent of the size of trades. With partial opaqueness, however,
traders might ￿nd it interesting to submit one order to the DM and route the remainder to
the CN. In this way, they ￿reveal￿ that orders were submitted to the CN. The results of
partial opaqueness could then be expected to become closer to those for transparency.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a dynamic microstructure model to study the interaction between two
trading systems. We studied the competition between a crossing network (CN) and a dealer
market (DM) within three di⁄erent informational settings. In particular, a transparency
setting in which agents have full information on the CN￿ s order book and DM trades was
contrasted with two opaqueness settings. Under ￿complete￿opaqueness, traders have infor-
mation neither on the CN book, nor on DM trades, while with ￿partial￿opaqueness they
observe only DM trades and not order ￿ ow to the CN. CNs are, in practice, quite opaque in
that they often prevent traders from observing the CN book.
We found that introducing a CN next to a DM generates two e⁄ects on order ￿ ow. First,
it leads to ￿order creation￿ , as the CN attracts investors who would refrain from trading in
the absence of a CN. This is because traders can save the half-spread when they trade at the
27CN, which makes the submission of a CN order pro￿table for these investors. Second, some
orders by relatively low willingness to trade agents trading on the DM are now diverted to
the CN. This ￿trade diversion￿induces competition for the DM.
We also showed that the execution probability at a CN is endogenous. It depends on
the (observed or expected) net order imbalance in the CN book, the observed order ￿ ow,
and the expectation of past and future orders. Thus, although we start from dealers willing
to provide liquidity at exogenously given bid and ask prices, we partly endogenize liquidity
supply and demand by looking at traders submitting orders for potential execution at a CN.
Our dynamic model displays two externalities on the CN, as documented in Hendershott and
Mendelson (2000), who consider competition between a DM and a CN in a static game with
simultaneous order submissions. On the one hand, the CN is characterized by a positive
(liquidity) externality as adding a CN buy (sell) order is bene￿cial to future CN sellers
(buyers). On the other hand, a CN exhibits a negative (crowding) externality as investors
with a low willingness to trade who arrive early in the trading day may preempt investors
with a higher willingness to trade who arrive later.
Our welfare results can be summarized as follows. First, when comparing markets in
isolation, we ￿nd that a CN provides greater overall welfare than a DM when the execution
probability at the CN and the relative spread (the bid-ask spread divided by the underlying
value) are high, i.e. when the time to a cross is long and the underlying value of the asset
is low. Second, order creation and trade diversion determine the impact of coexistence of
trading systems and the degree of transparency on welfare. For assets with a high relative
spread, overall welfare increases with coexistence of trading venues as compared to a DM
in isolation and with transparency as compared to both opaqueness settings. The positive
contribution to welfare of order creation is then substantial enough to compensate for the
limited negative impact of trade diversion. For low values of the relative spread, overall
welfare decreases when there is coexistence and transparency compared to a DM in isolation.
The negative impact of trade diversion then outweighs the positive impact of order creation.
Finally, our model o⁄ers a number of empirical predictions on order ￿ ow patterns. In par-
ticular, we ￿nd systematic patterns in order ￿ ow under transparency and partial opaqueness.
These patterns stem from changes in the net order imbalance at the CN￿ s order book. With
transparency, we found that the probability that the next order is a CN order at the same
side of the market is smaller after such an order than after any other order. In addition,
the probability of a DM sell decreases and the probability of a DM buy increases when the
28previous order was a CN buy order. Only CN orders generate time-varying order ￿ ow on
both trading systems as DM trades leave the CN￿ s order book una⁄ected. Systematic pat-
terns also arise with partial opaqueness. Although traders now only observe past DM trades
and no CN orders, they use this information to form expectations on the CN￿ s order book
imbalance and to determine their trading strategy. We have shown that the degree of trans-
parency at the CN has important implications for order ￿ ow. More speci￿cally, compared
to a transparent CN, order ￿ ow patterns may reverse when the CN is opaque. In general,
our empirical predictions demonstrate that it is important to take the interaction between
trading systems, as well as their institutional characteristics, into account when measuring
￿normal￿order ￿ ow. Some order or trade ￿ ow sequences, when analyzed in individual mar-
kets, could be interpreted incorrectly as being driven by informed trading, whereas they are
actually caused by the interaction of trading systems. An interesting empirical application
of our model would, therefore, be to determine the importance of this ￿interaction e⁄ect￿in
explaining observed order ￿ ow patterns relative to other factors, such as private information
or dealers￿inventory management. We leave this for future research.
29Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that the trader at time t is a buyer. She selects her
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can be interpreted as follows. If this condition is ful￿lled, then pb
t;tr
￿￿ ￿V ￿ A+B
2
￿
￿ ￿ ￿V ￿ A;
which implies that even for ￿ ￿, the pro￿t of an order to the CN is higher than the pro￿t of a
DM trade. In that case, traders always choose to submit a CN order and the region of ￿s for






















The cuto⁄ ￿s between submitting a CN order and remaining out of the market are de-
termined by how large the trader￿ s valuation of the asset is, relative to its price. The lowest
￿-type who would buy at the CN is the one who values the asset at
A+B
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A similar proof can be constructed for a seller at time t.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, from the de￿nitions of ￿ ￿
b
t;tr and ￿s
t;tr, the proposition can
also be formulated as follows (with e.g. ￿ ￿
b
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(ii) ￿s
t;tr (nt ￿ 1) ￿ ￿s
t;tr (nt) ￿ ￿s
t;tr (nt + 1)
:
30We prove the proposition in a recursive way and by contradiction. As a starting point, it
can be seen that the proposition holds for the terminal period T. At time T, the execution
probability of a CN order is either one (if a trader can join the side where the net order
imbalance, nT, is favorable) or zero otherwise. Then the proposition holds as:
￿ ￿
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when the execution probability of a CN order equals zero.
Suppose now that the proposition is false. However, since it is true at T, there must exist
a period ￿ such that for t > ￿, all parts of the proposition hold, but at ￿ at least one part
does not hold. In what follows, we posit the existence of such a ￿ and show that for each of
the possible ensuing states the action is not optimal.
Assume the right-hand side of the inequality in statement (ii) does not hold at ￿. Then:
￿s
￿;tr (n￿) < ￿s
￿;tr (n￿ + 1):




￿;tr (n￿ + 1)
￿
submits a DM trade
when the CN￿ s net order imbalance is n￿ + 1 and a CN order when the CN￿ s net order
imbalance is n￿. In contrast, suppose that the seller would opt for a CN order in the former
case (i.e. when the CN￿ s net order imbalance is n￿ + 1). The CN￿ s net order imbalance at
￿ + 1 then becomes n￿. If the CN￿ s net order imbalance at ￿ is n￿, the trader submits a CN
sell order, which results in the CN￿ s net order imbalance at ￿ + 1 being n￿ ￿ 1. The next
trader, arriving at ￿ + 1, can be either a buyer or a seller.
1. A seller arrives at ￿ + 1
In this case, we know that by assumption statement (ii) holds for all periods t > ￿.
Therefore
ps
￿+1;tr (n￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ps
￿+1;tr (n￿):
Moreover, an order submitted at ￿ + 1 will only be executed if the previous order in
31the queue has been executed. This means, conditional on a seller arriving at ￿ + 1:
ps
￿;tr (n￿jseller arrives at ￿ + 1) ￿ ps
￿;tr (n￿ + 1jseller arrives at ￿ + 1):















￿;tr (n￿jseller arrives at ￿ + 1)
￿ B ￿ ￿￿V:
Thus, conditional on the trader arriving at ￿ + 1 being a seller, the payo⁄ of a CN sell
order is higher when the net order imbalance of the CN book is relatively higher in
period ￿. Hence, in this case it cannot be optimal for an investor to submit a DM trade
at ￿ when the net order imbalance is relatively higher.
2. A buyer arrives at ￿ + 1
We know that by assumption statement (i) is true at ￿ + 1. This means that either





￿+1;tr (n￿); ￿ ￿
b
￿+1;tr (n￿ ￿ 1)
i
submit a DM trade when the CN￿ s net order imbalance is n￿, which results in a net
order imbalance of n￿ at ￿ +2, and submit a CN order when the net order imbalance is
n￿ ￿1, which yields a net order imbalance at ￿ +2 of n￿. Thus, the net order imbalance
is back at n￿ at ￿ +2 for both possibilities. Since execution probabilities only hinge on
the net order imbalance, the execution probability for a seller arriving at ￿ + 2 equals
ps
￿+2;tr (n￿) for both possibilities. Further, since statement (ii) holds at ￿ + 2:
ps
￿+2;tr (n￿ + 1) ￿ ps
￿+2;tr (n￿):
Given that an order submitted at ￿ + 2 can only be executed if an order submitted at















￿;tr ((n￿)jbuyer arrives at ￿ + 1)
￿ B ￿ ￿￿V:
Hence, conditional upon a buyer arriving at ￿ + 1, there is a contradiction.
The right-hand side of the inequality in statement (ii) is therefore true. A similar proof
can be constructed for the left-hand side of the inequality in (ii) and for statement (i).
Proof of Proposition 4. Part a) With transparency, the time t probability of occurrence
of a CN buy at t + 1 is
Pr
￿
















Suppose that nt < T ￿(t + 1), such that the probability of execution of a CN buy at t+1 is
not zero. Then ￿b
t+1;tr (nt+1) is independent of the net order imbalance. If the order at t was
a CN buy, then the net order imbalance at t + 1 is nt + 1, if it was a CN sell the net order
imbalance becomes nt￿1 and if the order was a DM trade, the net order imbalance does not
change: nt = nt+1. From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that
￿ ￿
b
t+1;tr (nt + 1) ￿ ￿ ￿
b
t+1;tr (nt) ￿ ￿ ￿
b
t+1;tr (nt ￿ 1):
Given that F (:) is monotonically nondecreasing in ￿, the result follows.
Suppose now that nt ￿ T ￿ (t + 1), meaning either no CN orders are submitted, and the
proposition holds trivially; or at t the extra CN order submitted changes the execution proba-
bility to zero. Then ￿ ￿
b
t+1;tr (nt + 1) = A
V ; hence the result follows since also ￿b
t+1;tr (nt+1) = A
V .
Part b) The time t probability of occurrence of a DM buy at t + 1 is
Pr
￿

















is ￿xed and independent of the net order imbalance. If the order at t was a CN buy,
then the net order imbalance at t + 1 is nt + 1, if it was a CN sell the net order imbalance
becomes nt ￿ 1; and if the order was a DM trade the net order imbalance does not change:
33nt = nt+1. From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that
￿ ￿
b
t+1;tr (nt + 1) ￿ ￿ ￿
b
t+1;tr (nt) ￿ ￿ ￿
b
t+1;tr (nt ￿ 1):
Given that F (:) is monotonically nondecreasing in ￿, the result follows.
For both a and b, similar proofs could be constructed for sell orders.
Before starting the proof of Proposition 5, we ￿rst state the following corollary:
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, 8 Et;po(nt); t, if the expected net order imbalance is one unit
higher, then the expected probability of execution of a buy (sell) order will be lower (higher). If
the expected net order imbalance is one unit lower, then the expected probability of execution
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￿
:
(both formulations, in terms of probabilities and in terms of betas, are equivalent)
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof proceeds along the same lines as the one of Proposition
2 and is omitted for brevity.
Proof of Proposition 5. Part a) With partial opaqueness, the time t probability of
occurrence of a CN buy at t + 1 is
Pr
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Suppose Et;po (nt) < T ￿ (t + 1), such that the expected probability of execution of a





is independent of the CN￿ s net
order imbalance. If at t a DM trade was observed, the expected net order imbalance does
not change: Et+1;po (nt) = Et+1;po (nt+1). If instead no order was observed at t, then the
expected net order imbalance at t + 1 is one of the following three cases: Et+1;po (nt) + 1 or
Et+1;po (nt) ￿ 1 or Et+1;po (nt), depending on whether at t a CN buy, CN sell, or no order
was submitted, respectively. The probabilities of occurrence of each case are computed by
the trader from F (:);￿s;￿b and the expected net order imbalance at t. Attach to these
34three possibilities the probabilities ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3, respectively. Then, the expected net order
imbalance is:
Et+1;po (nt) + ￿1 ￿ ￿2
since ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3 = 1. Hence, comparing the expected net order imbalance after observing
a DM trade and observing no DM trade, we get
Et+1;po (nt) versus Et+1;po (nt) + ￿1 ￿ ￿2:
Three cases can occur:











Et+1;po (nt) + ￿1 ￿ ￿2
￿
such that, given that F (:) is monotonically nondecreasing in ￿, it holds that the left-
hand side of equation (14) ￿ the right-hand side of equation (14).











Et+1;po (nt) + ￿1 ￿ ￿2
￿
such that the left-hand side of equation (14) ￿ the right-hand side of equation (14).











Et+1;po (nt + ￿1 ￿ ￿2)
￿
such that the left-hand side of equation (14) = the right-hand side of equation (14).
Suppose Et;po (nt) ￿ T ￿(t + 1). This means that either no CN orders are expected to be
submitted, in which case the proposition holds trivially, or at t the extra CN order submit-
ted changes the expected net order imbalance such that the expected execution probability
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Part b) This proof proceeds along the same lines as part a) and is omitted for brevity.
For both parts a and b, similar proofs can be constructed for the other market side.
35Appendix B: Formal De￿nitions of Ine¢ ciencies
The ￿CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency￿and the ￿CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency￿fully explain
the di⁄erence between OW
max and overall welfare for each of the considered isolation cases
and coexistence settings. By formally de￿ning those two ine¢ ciencies, we also implicitly
de￿ne overall welfare. Indeed, simple subtraction of the sum of these two ine¢ ciencies from
OW
max provides the overall welfare for each case and setting that we consider.











that do not realize any gains from trade. We ￿rst describe the expected
ine¢ ciency under coexistence for traders arriving at time t given a (expected) net order



















(V ￿ ￿tV )f (￿t)d￿t:






, with i = tr;co or po. In a similar fashion, the second term
presents the unrealized gains for sellers. Notice that these probabilities hinge on (i) the
informational setting and (ii) the (expected) net order imbalance and time to the cross.
To obtain the ex ante average per-period CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency, we need to take into
account the expected probability of ending up with a particular state at time t and compute
the appropriate averages for t and average over t = 1;:::;T. For the isolation cases, the CN-
only-traders ine¢ ciency is computed in a similar way, with the probability of non-execution













sellers in a CN in isolation, respectively.
Under coexistence, the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency measures the impact on overall
welfare of buyers with ￿t 2
￿
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submitting orders to the
CN. Formally, for a given setting at time t implying a (expected) net order imbalance, it can




















(V ￿ ￿tV )f (￿t)d￿t:
The ￿rst term accounts for the unrealized trading gains from buyers with ￿t 2
￿
A










. Similarly, the second term represents












. Notice that these probabilities hinge on (i) the informational
setting and (ii) the (expected) net order imbalance and time to the cross. Summing over
all possible states, applying the appropriate weights for time t, and taking the average over
t = 1;:::;T yields the average per-period CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency. For the isolation
cases, the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency is computed in a similar way. Note further that
the set of such traders is empty for a DM in isolation, as no traders are diverted. For a CN
in isolation, the two integrals are taken between the boundaries A
V and ￿ ￿, and ￿ and B
V , with












for buyers and sellers,
respectively.
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Note: This ￿gure depicts the equilibrium of our model with only a dealer
market (Panel A) or only a crossing network (Panel B). The optimal
strategies of agents are drawn, conditional upon their ￿ and trading
orientation.
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Note: This ￿gure depicts the equilibrium of our model with a dealer
market (DM) and a crossing network (CN) in coexistence with i = tr;co
or po (denoting transparency, complete opaqueness and partial opaque-
ness, respectively). The optimal strategies of agents are drawn, condi-

















may di⁄er for i = tr;co or po.
Figure 2: Order Submission Strategies with Dealer Market and Crossing Network
in Coexistence
42Note: This ￿gure presents average per-period overall welfare for coexis-
tence of a CN and a DM under transparency, OW tr, and partial opaque-
ness, OW po. Transparency is presented as a thick dotted line, partial
opaqueness with a thick full line. Also average per-period overall welfare
for the DM in isolation, OW
DM
, and for the CN in isolation, OW
CN
,
are included for comparison as a thin full line and a thin dashed line,
respectively. The results for complete opaqueness are very close to those
of partial opaqueness and are therefore not shown. The thick full line
with circles represents the maximum average per-period overall welfare
OW
max
. In the computations, we assume that ￿ is uniformly distributed
over [0:8;1:2], ￿b = 0:5,
A+B
2 = V and T = 3.
Figure 3: Average Per-Period Overall Welfare
43Note: This ￿gure displays the average per-period ine¢ ciencies that drive
a wedge between maximum and realized overall welfare. The left panel
presents the CN-only-traders ine¢ ciency. The right panel shows the
CN-diverted-traders ine¢ ciency. These ine¢ ciencies are de￿ned in Ap-
pendix B. In both panels thin full (dashed) lines represent ine¢ ciencies
for the DM (CN) in isolation. Note that the CN-diverted-traders ine¢ -
ciency is zero for the DM in isolation. Thick dotted (full) lines represent
the coexistence of DM and CN for transparency (partial opaqueness).
The results for complete opaqueness are very close to those of partial
opaqueness and are therefore not shown. In the computations, we as-
sume that ￿ is uniformly distributed over [0:8;1:2], ￿b = 0:5,
A+B
2 = V
and T = 3.
Figure 4: Ine¢ ciencies
44Note: Panel A and B of this ￿gure display average per-period trader
welfare and average per-period dealer welfare. The DM in isolation and
the CN in isolation are depicted as a thin full line and a thin dashed line,
respectively. Note that dealer welfare for the CN in isolation is zero.
Transparency for coexistence of a CN and a DM (tr) is presented as a
thick dotted line, partial opaqueness (po) as a thick full line. The results
for complete opaqueness are very close to those of partial opaqueness
and are therefore not shown. In the computations, we assume that ￿ is
uniformly distributed over [0:8;1:2], ￿b = 0:5,
A+B
2 = V and T = 3.
Figure 5: Average Per-Period Trader and Dealer Welfare
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